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Abstract—In 3GPP eMBMS, sometimes sessions will be discon-
nected unexpectedly due to the miss of session keys. Although
rekeying can prevent old users from getting multicast data, it
also causes authorized users to miss subsequent data if they
miss the key update messages. Thus, re-authentication is needed
to obtain lost keys from KMM. We point out this problem in
our previous work [1]. In this paper, we further propose a new
KeySet algorithm, which can pre-issue a number of keys to
users when they join eMBMS. The advantage is that a user can
still decode multicast data even if it misses some key updates
tentatively. However, the cost is that allowing some old users to
freely enjoying multicast for some time. In this paper, we quantify
the tradeoff and derive the optimal case.
Index Terms—LTE broadcast, Multimedia broadcast and mul-
ticast service (MBMS), performance analysis, Quality of Experi-
ence (QoE).
I. INTRODUCTION
T
HE explosion of mobile data is fueling the growth of
4G deployment and new services. According to [2], 68%
US respondents and 30% users in France indicated intension
in watching TV via hand-held devices while on move. To
meet the increasing demand for mobile video services, 3GPP
proposes the evolved Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service
(eMBMS) in LTE-A.
Wireless broadcast services are, however, vulnerable to
various security attacks since eavesdropping becomes easier.
3GPP introduces Key Management Mechanism (KMM) to
protect eMBMS contents. Multimedia contents for the same
group of User Equipment (UE) devices can be encrypted by a
group key. This implies that when a UE joins/leaves the group,
the current key needs to be revoked, referring as rekeying.
Consequently, a UE holding the old key is unable to access
the subsequent content. On the other hand, if a UE experiences
tentative disconnection during key update, KMM needs to
resend it, referring as re-authentication.
Previous studies (e.g., [3]–[7]) have addressed the security-
performance tradeoff in wireless networks. A review of key
management can be found in [1]. Different from other wireless
networks, eMBMS exhibits the following characteristics: (i)
massive group numbers, (ii) dynamic group topology, and
(iii) unexpected wireless disconnections. These characteristics
make re-authentication more frequently. However, the previous
researches did not point out the re-authentication problem
since the unintended disconnection happens unpredictably. We
formulate this problem into an analytical model to investigate
it. How to update group keys at a reasonable cost while
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preventing old users from accessing multicast data poses a
challenge.
In this paper, we propose a new KeySet scheme to reduce
re-authentication cost while keeping the cost of missing keys
low. In our scheme, when a UE joins an eMBMS group, it is
pre-assigned a sequence of K keys, instead of one. The first
key is the new group key due to the joining of this UE, while
the other K − 1 keys are to be used in the next K − 1 revoking
events. This design greatly relieves the missing key problem.
However, a too large K will allow too much free enjoying
time. We will quantify the tradeoff and derive the optimal K
later.
II. BACKGROUNDS
The eMBMS KMM architecture defined in 3GPP consists of
Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF), Broads-cast/Multicast
Service Center (BM-SC), content provider, Home Subscriber
Server (HSS), and UEs. BSF is for initialization when a UE
enters an eMBMS system for the first time. BM-SC conducts
authentication procedures with UEs. Content provider provides
video data. HSS is responsible for user identification.
To protect multicast data, BM-SC generates four security
keys, namely eMBMS Request Key (MRK), eMBMS Service
Key (MSK), eMBMS Traffic Key (MTK), and eMBMS User
Key (MUK). MRK is to authenticate a UE when performing
key requests to BM-SC. MUK protects MSK distribution.
MSK is to protect the distribution of MTK, while MTK secures
multicast data. Fig. 1 illustrates the key relationship, where
A → B stands for “A protects B”.
When a UE joins an eMBMS service, the User Service Join
procedure in Fig. 2 is triggered. {X}Y denotes that key X is
encrypted by key Y. UE{i... j } refers to the set {UEi , UEi+1,
... , UEj}. In this example, UE9 is a newly joining one.
• Step 1: UE9 and BM-SC perform bootstrapping procedure
to generate MRK9 and MUK9. Then, UE9 performs the
eMBMS User Service Registration procedure with BM-
SC by using MRK9.
• Step 2: BM-SC returns HTTP 200 OK Authentication to
accept the joining request of UE9. Otherwise, it returns
HTTP 401 WWW-Authentication for rejection.
• Step 3: BM-SC generates the new MSK (MSK789).
• Step 4: BM-SC unicasts the new key MSK789 encrypted
by MUKi to UE{7...9}. Afterward, UE{7...9} uses MUKi
to decrypt {MSK789}MUKi .
• Step 5: BM-SC generates the new MTK1−9.
• Step 6: In 6(a) and 6(b), BM-SC sends {MTK1−9}MSK789
to UE{7...9}. Upon receiving {MTK1−9}MSK789 , UE{7...9}
decrypts it to get the new MTK1−9 by MSK789. Similarly,
MTK1−9 is encrypted to UE{1...3} and UE{4...6}.
• Step 7: BM-SC continues to broadcast videos encrypted
by MTK1−9 to UE{1...9}.
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Fig. 1: Key relationship in KMM.
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Fig. 2: Example of UE9 joining an eMBMS service.
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Fig. 3: Key hierarchy in eMBMS.
The leaving procedure is similar and can be found in [8].
Fig. 3 shows the change of key hierarchy when UE joins/leaves
the service.
III. PROPOSED KEYSET
In a wireless network, a UE may experience unexpected
disconnection. This may lead to a lot of re-authentications
as there are more users joining/leaving multicast services.
The cost to the core network is thus high. To relieve this
problem, we propose a KeySet scheme. Upon entering into
eMBMS, a UE will be pre-issued a set of keys {MTKC ,
MTKC+1, ... , MTKC+K−1} from BM-SC, where MTKC
is the current key and the other keys are to be used in
the next K − 1 rounds. Therefore, when a UE experiences
temporary disconnection, it has a high chance to decrypt
the subsequent content without needing re-authentication. For
the core network, whenever the system advances to a new
key, it only updates it to those UEs whose latest key has
expired. Therefore, the update cost for the core network is
also significantly reduced.
One issue is how to choose a suitable K . A larger K leads to
less re-authentication cost. However, a larger K also allows old
UEs to use their remaining keys to freely enjoy the subsequent
contents for a while.
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive a mathematical model to study the
impacts of K . Let E[C1] be the re-authentication count of a
single UE on the original KMM and E[CK ] be that of KeySet.
We quantify the performance by the expected re-authentication
ratio γ(K) =
E[CK ]
E[C1]
.
Let E[FreeK ] be the potential free enjoying time that a
single UE can gain in KeySet.
Below, we introduce some notations (refer to Fig. 4).
1) As that in [1], [9], UEs arrive to an eMBMS service
by Poisson process. We have pmf P(NA(t) = n) =
e−λAt
(λAt)
n
n!
, where λA is the arrival rate and n is
the number of arrivals within time t. The problem
is modeled as an M/G/∞ system, where departure
process is also the same as the arrival process with pmf
P(ND(t) = n) = e
−λD t (λD t)
n
n!
, where λD=λA.
2) The number of rekeying operations in an eMBMS
service within t is modeled by NR(t), which con-
sists the UEs joining and leaving the group, i.e.,
NR(t)=NA(t)+ND(t). Since NA(t) and ND(t) are i.i.d.,
we have:
P(NR(t) = n)
=
n∑
k=0
P(NA(t) = k)P(ND(t) = n − k)
=
n∑
k=0
[
e−λAt
(λAt)
k
k!
]
×
[
e−λD t
(λDt)
n−k
(n − k)!
]
= e−λR t
(λRt)
n
n!
,
in which NR(t) is also a Poisson process with rate λR =
2λA. The pdf of tR is ftR (x) = λRe
−λR x , with mean
=
1
λR
. The CDF of tR is FtR (x) = 1 − e
−λR x .
3) Let td be the duration between two disconnections of
a single UE. Assume that the arrival of disconnections
is a Poisson process with rate λd with pmf P(Nd(t) =
n) = e−λd t
(λd t)
n
n!
. The length of a UE’s eMBMS session
is modeled by variance tu with pdf ftu (x) = λue
−λu x .
4) Let TK denote the effective period given a new UE K
keys. Since rekeying follows Poisson process, TK is the
sum of K independent exponential random variables.
By convolution, TK is Erlan-distributed with parame-
ter (K, λR), pdf fTK (x) = λRe
−λR x (λR x)
K−1
(K−1)!
and CDF
FTK (x) = 1 −
∑K−1
k=0
1
k!
e−λR x(λRx)
k . Let t ′
R
denote the
time interval from a UE entering the disconnected status
to the next rekeying operation. According to Excess
Life Theorem, we have ft′
R
(x) =
1−FtR (x)
E[tR ]
= λRe
−λR x .
Let T ′
K
denote the time interval from the last time
when a UE entering the disconnected status in TK to
the (C + K)-th rekeying operation. Again, we have
fT ′
K
(x) = λR
K
[1 − FTK (x)] =
λR
K
(
∑K−1
k=0
1
k!
e−λR x(λRx)
k).
Let t ′
d
denote the time duration between a UE entering
the disconnected status to its returning to eMBMS. The
pdf is ft′
d
(x).
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Fig. 4: Illustration of notations.
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Fig. 5: (a) Case A1: tu < TK , (b) Case A2: tu ≥ TK .
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Fig. 6: (a) Case A2a: the first disconnection arrives in tK′u ,
(b) Case A2b: the first disconnection arrives in TK .
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Fig. 7: (a) Case A2b and Case A2b1: tu ≥ TK and t
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< T ′
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(b) Case A2b and Case A2b2: tu ≥ TK and t
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Fig. 8: (a) Case A2 and Case A2c: tu ≥ TK and t
′
d
< t ′
R
, (b)
Case A2 and Case A2d: tu ≥ TK and t
′
d
≥ t ′
R
.
A. Expected Re-authentication Count E[CK ]
To derive E[CK ], we consider two cases as shown in Fig. 5.
Case A1 is for tu < TK and Case A2 is for tu ≥ TK . By total
probability formula,
E[CK ] = E[CK |A1] P(A1) + E[CK |A2] P(A2). (1)
Case A1: The UE dose not need to perform re-authentication
since its remaining keys can be used as shown in Fig. 5(a).
So E[CK |A1] = E[CK |tu < TK ] = 0. (2)
Case A2: The re-authentication count is equal to the sum of
re-authentication counts in TK and tK′u as shown in Fig. 5(b).
We have
E[CK |A2] = E[CTK |A2] + E[CtK′u |A2], (3)
where E[CTK |A2] and E[CtK′u |A2] are the re-authentication
counts in TK and tK′u , respectively. To derive E[CTK |A2],
we consider two subcases as shown in Fig. 6. Case A2a and
Case A2b are for the first disconnection in tK′u and in TK ,
respectively. Then, Case A2b1 is for t ′
d
< T ′
K
and Case A2b2
is for t ′
d
≥ T ′
K
(Fig. 7). To derive E[CtK′u |A2], we consider
two subcases. Case A2c is for t ′
d
< t ′
R
and Case A2d is for
t ′
d
≥ t ′
R
(Fig. 8). We then have:
E[CTK |A2] = E[CTK |A2,A2a] P(A2a)
+ E[CTK |A2,A2b] P(A2b)
= E[CTK |A2,A2a] P(A2a)
+
[
E[CTK |A2,A2b,A2b1] P(A2b1)
+ E[CTK |A2,A2a,A2b2] P(A2b2)
]
P(A2b) (4)
E[CtK′u |A2] = E[CtK′u |A2,A2c] P(A2c)
+ E[CtK′u |A2,A2d] P(A2d). (5)
Case A2a: Since there is no disconnection in TK , re-
authentication is not needed. Thus, E[CTK |A2,A2a] = 0.
Case A2b: This case may require re-authentication since the
first disconnection arrives in TK . However, we need to consider
Case A2b1 and Case A2b2.
Case A2b1: Since the UE returns to eMBMS before the
expiration of its K-th key, re-authentication is not needed.
Therefore, E[CTK |A2,A2b,A2b1] = 0.
Case A2b2: In this case, re-authentication is needed because
the UE will always miss the (C + K)-th rekeying operation.
Then, E[CTK |A2,A2b,A2b2] = 1, where “1” means the last
disconnection in TK .
Case A2c: Again, no re-authentication is needed (Fig. 8(a)).
Thus, E[CtK′u |A2,A2c] = 0.
Case A2d: This is similar to Case A2b2, so
E[CtK′u |A2,A2d] =
λd
λu
. (6)
Applying the above cases to Eq. (1), we have:
E[CK ]
=
[ [
1 −
( λR
λd + λR
)K ]∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
s
ft′
d
(t) fT ′
K
(s)dtds
+
λd
λu
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
s
ft′
d
(t) ft′
R
(s)dtds
] ( λR
λu + λR
)K
. (7)
Note that in the original KMM, a UE obtains one key from
BM-SC. We can use Eq. (7) to derive its re-authentication
count by setting K = 1.
B. Expected Free Enjoying Time E[FreeK ]
We have E[FreeK ] = E[RemainKey] × E
[ Free_Using_Time
Key
]
where E[RemainKey] = E[K − 1 − (Rekey within tu)] = K −
1 − λR
λu
. If K − 1 − λR
λu
< 0, it means that the UE consumes
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Fig. 10: The effects of E[tu] on E[FreeK ] with different K .
the pre-issue keys completely. E
[ Free_Using_Time
Key
]
is the excess
life time for the next rekey ( 1
λR
). So,
E[FreeK ] = (K − 1 −
λR
λu
) ×
1
λR
. (8)
V. SIMULATION VALIDATION
In this section, we validates our analytical model by ns2
simulations. The differences between analytical and simula-
tion results fall within 1%. Unless otherwise specified, the
following parameter are used: λR = 100/hour, E[tu] = 1 hour,
λd = 10/hour, and E[t
′
d
] = 6 sec.
Given different K , Fig. 9(a) and Fig. 9(b) show analytic
and simulated E[CK ] and γ(K) by varying rekeying rate λR
and resident time tu . The simulation results match well with
our analytical results. These results all show the effect of
increasing K . Given a fixed K , Fig. 9(c) shows the relationship
between λR and E[CK ]. A higher rate λR will lead to a larger
cost E[CK ] because key updates are more frequent. Given a
fixed K , Fig. 9 (d) illustrates the relationship between resident
time E[tu] and E[CK ]. Fig. 10 shows that the effect of K
and E[tu] on free enjoying time E[FreeK ]. All these results
validate the correctness of our analyses.
VI. DERIVATION OF THE OPTIMAL K
In this section, we discuss the selection of K . In particular,
selecting a suitable K to balance the tradeoff is important.
Thus, we formulate the objective function as:
arg min
K
F = w1E[CK ] + w2E[FreeK ],
subject to 0 < E[FreeK ] ≤ Θ, (9)
where Θ is the upper bound of E[FreeK ], which can be
determined by content providers according to their business
policies. The coefficients of w1 and w2 denote the weighting
factors. Increasing w1 (or w2) emphasizes more on E[CK ]
(E[FreeK ]). Here, we do not specify either w1 or w2 because
such a value should be determined by mobile operators and
should take management policies into consideration. In ad-
dition, since the closed form of E[CK ] and E[FreeK ] has
been derived in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), respectively, the optimal
value of K can be founded by solving the differential equation
F ′ = 0 and F ′′ > 0.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose KeySet to reduce re-authentication
cost by distributing a number of security keys K to a UE
conducting authentication procedure. The K keys prevent UE
from missing rekeying operation while in disconnection status
at cost of free enjoying time. Instead of tuning K randomly,
our performance study provides theoretical guidelines and a
systematic way for network operators to configure a suitable
K . An optimal equation is presented to get the optimal K .
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